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ABSTRACT 
Building on a unique dataset that contains 13 different tax categories of 
the Greek state over the period 1833-1933, this paper studies the effect of 
democratisation on the size and the composition of tax revenues. 
Empirical analysis suggests that the radical reform that enfranchised all 
adult males in Greece in 1864 did not affect the level of taxation, but did 
exert a significant impact on its structure. Universal male suffrage was 
accompanied by an amazing reduction in rural taxes (e.g., taxes on land) 
and remarkable increases in indirect taxes – mostly in custom and excises 
duties. These findings clearly indicate that there were political economy 
motives behind this shift in the implemented fiscal policy. In particular, 
the Greek governments changed the structure of taxation in order to 
satisfy the large majority of the electorate, who were peasants and 
farmers, ensuring a minimum level of social cohesion. Using also a sample 
of 12 Western European countries over the same period, we show that 
the phase of economic development induced a differentiated effect of 
democratisation on the size and the structure of taxation. 
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Democratisation and tax structure: Greece 
versus Europe from a historical perspective 
 
1. Introduction 
Conventional theory suggests that extending the voting franchise to the 
poorer segments of society increases the demand for redistributive public 
spending and fiscal expansion (see, e.g., Meltzer and Richard, 1981), since 
competing political parties are expected to shift their policy platforms to 
respond to the preferences of the hitherto disenfranchised voters1. A large 
number of studies employing historical data have placed the spotlight on 
the empirical investigation of the relationship between democratisation 
and fiscal policy (see, e.g., Lindert, 2004). In particular, these studies 
examine whether the so-called “first wave of democratisation” 
(Huntington, 1991), which took place from 1828 to 1926, affected the 
level and pattern of government spending (Lindert, 1994; Aidt et al., 2006) 
or of taxation (Aidt and Jensen, 2009a)2.  
In broad terms, most of these studies have highlighted the importance of 
various intermediating factors that make the relationship between 
                                                 
 
1 This poses the question, though, of why powerful elites decided to dilute power by offering voting 
rights to the poorer segments of society. Recent research has stressed income inequality (Justman and 
Gradstein, 1999; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000; Boix, 2003) and conflicting interests within the elite 
(Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; Llavador and Oxby, 2005) as potential reasons of why voting rights were 
granted in Western Europe during the 19th century. However, in all alternative cases, scholars share the 
prediction that full enfranchisement should increase the size of the government. For an excellent review 
of alternative theories of franchise extension, see Przeworski (2009). 
2 A parallel strand of this literature investigates the relationship between democratization and fiscal 
policy by employing modern data for a large set of developed and developing countries (see Mulligan et 
al., 2004; Profeta et al., 2013; Acemoglu et al., 2015). These empirical studies focus on the more recent 
waves of democratization (i.e., the second and the third waves) and investigate whether they have 
affected the implemented fiscal policy.  
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democratisation and fiscal policy much more complex (see, e.g., Aidt et al., 
2010). One significant factor seems to be the phase of economic 
development and the consequent structure of the domestic economy (see 
e.g., Boix 2003; Aidt and Jensen, 2009b). In particular, economic history 
suggests that industrialised economies were in need of increased fiscal 
revenues that would ensure provision of specific public goods, such as 
health and education. The accumulation of physical capital in the process 
of industrialisation raised the importance of human capital in the growth 
process, reflecting the complementarity between capital and skills3. 
However, since the pure laissez-faire policy failed to develop a proper 
educational system, citizens demanded that the authorities need to 
provide this public good (see Galor, 2005). At the same time, domestic 
migration of the working population from the countryside to the urban 
centres generated severe problems of increased urban mortality and 
morbidity that should have been addressed by investments in health-
related amenities (see e.g., Szreter, 1997; Szreter and Mooney, 1998)4.  
A parallel literature demonstrates that the demand for revenues to 
finance these public goods eventually will manifest in implemented 
policies when the poorer segments of society participate in the electoral 
process (see, Justman and Gradstein, 1999; Lizzeri and Persico, 2004; Aidt 
et al., 2010). Simultaneously, the provision of public education can 
complement this effect, since an increase in the literacy rate of the 
                                                 
3 Evidence for the complementarity between technological progress (or capital) and skills is provided by 
Goldin and Katz (1998).  
4 The standard of living issue in the era of the industrial revolution has been investigated by a large 
number of scholars (see e.g., Hobsbawm, 1975). For instance, Szreter and Mooney (1998), focusing on 
the largest industrial British cities, show that life expectancy at birth was lower in 1871 than in 1821, 
despite rising real wages, attributing this decline to the deteriorating urban environment. 
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domestic population works to improve the tax collection capacity of the 
state and the reliance on direct forms of taxation (see Aidt and Jensen, 
2009b), allowing for fiscal expansion in democratic regimes over time5. 
This outcome of democratisation on the size and composition of tax 
revenues – in favour of direct taxes – might not necessarily be the case for 
developing economies and even more so for a newly democratised 
agrarian economy. This is because, in such a case, the tax collection 
capacity of the state is definitely low, whereas public investment in human 
capital, which could help alleviate this problem over time, is not as urgent 
as in an industrialised economy6. Therefore, when democratisation takes 
place at an early phase of economic development, this may lead to 
patterns of taxation that deviate substantially from the predictions of the 
conventional theory. 
Our analysis employs a unique dataset of the Greek state in order to 
explore the effects of democratisation on the size and the composition of 
the tax structure in an agrarian economy in the 19th century. Notably, 
Greece established universal male suffrage in 1864 during a period where 
                                                 
5 Specifically, Aidt and Jensen (2009b) suggest that the cost of collecting income and other direct taxes 
relative to the cost of collecting indirect taxes fell as literacy and numerical skills of the potential 
taxpayers improve. Related to that, Besley and Persson (2011; 2013) show that developed countries rely 
to a greater extent on income taxes as opposed to indirect taxes (e.g., customs) than developing 
countries do. A fundamental reason for this is that it is much harder for developing countries to collect 
direct taxes, which require major investments in fiscal capacity, namely in enforcement and compliance 
structures throughout the entire economy. 
6 Two reasons that can justify the lower level of public investment in human capital in a 
developing/agrarian economy are the following: (1) The complementarity between human capital and 
land is very low in the production process and definitely much lower than in the case of an industrialised 
economy (see Galor, 2005 for more details on this). On top of this, it should not be overlooked that 
landed elites do not benefit from public investment in human capital, since universal public education 
will increase the cost of labor beyond the increase in average labor productivity in the agricultural 
sector, reducing in this way the return of land (Galor et al., 2009); (2) The priorities of a government for 
internal stability at this early stage of development can significantly affect the allocation of the public 
budget in favour of security expenditures and against health and education expenditures (see, Aidt et 
al., 2006). 
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76% of the population was living in agricultural areas - defined as the 
percentage of population living in cities of less than two thousand people 
(see Figure 1). We use this variable, as provided by Dertilis (1993), to 
proxy for size of the agricultural sector in Greece, since population 
statistics first became available in 1828 whereas occupational statistics in 
1861. Therefore, using this proxy allows us to avoid extrapolation of 
occupational data back in 1833 -the first year of our sample7. Our dataset 
covers the period 1833-1933 and contains information for 13 different tax 
categories (e.g., land tax, income tax, etc.), based on the methodology 
introduced by Flora et al. (1983), thereby allowing us to discern tax 
revenues into four major tax categories: (1) rural taxes; (2) urban taxes; (3) 
customs taxes; and (4) market taxes. Urban taxes are decomposed further 
into income taxes, trade and corporation taxes, and capital taxes.  
Our second contribution is that we use an identical classification of tax 
instruments for a sample of 12 Western European countries to investigate 
if the effect of democratisation on the size and the composition of 
taxation depends on the phase of economic development, as proxied by 
the prevalence of the agricultural sector. In contrast to Greece, these 
European countries, drifted also by the “first wave of democratisation”, 
had narrower agricultural sectors. In particular, their average figure of the 
workforce occupied in the agriculture sector in the year of 
democratisation - according to Boix et al.’s (2013) classification – is half 
                                                 
7 Moreover, when using the census of 1861 we found that the percentage of the core occupations in 
agriculture -landowners, farmers and peasants- account for 63% of the total labour force, whereas 
taking also into account other occupations related to the agricultural sector (e.g., muleteers or 
merchandisers) this figure increases above 70% and very close to 74.48% - the estimated percentage of 
the agricultural population in 1861.  
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that of Greece, namely about 38% (see Figure 2).8 More importantly, the 
variation we observe from case to case motivates this exercise, since it 
allows us to test for a differentiated effect of democracy conditional on 
the phase of economic development. 
Our empirical analysis for Greece clearly indicates no effect of 
democratisation on the level of taxation (% of GDP), though it does 
identify a significant impact on the composition of taxes. More precisely, 
universal male suffrage was accompanied by an amazing decrease in rural 
taxes (i.e., land and assessed taxes) and increases in specific categories of 
indirect taxes – mostly taxes related to custom duties and excises duties. 
Apparently, the reduction in taxes on land was in favour of the small 
peasants and farmers who lived in rural areas9. However, somehow 
paradoxically, the increases in indirect taxes were also in favour of the 
rural population and, at the same time, at the expense of the urban 
population. This occurred because during that period Greek economy was 
a subsistence agriculture economy —especially in the countryside— and 
the rural population was able to evade indirect taxes through self-
consumption (see Dertilis, 1993, pp.159-164). In contrast, the population 
in urban regions, including its poorer segments, was considerably harmed, 
since local or imported basic goods (wheat, textiles, and energy producing 
raw materials) were burdened by indirect taxes (see Dertilis, 2015, 
pp.794-799; pp.806-808)10.  
                                                 
8 We defer a more detailed discussion of Figures 1 and 2 until Section 5. 
9 During that period, Greece was an agrarian economy characterized by a large number of small farmers 
and a relatively equal distribution of land. See below for more details on this issue. 
10 Tables 4.2 and 4.2a in Dertilis (2015, pp.1169-1171) present data concerning imports and exports 
during that period.  
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Following the rationale in Dertilis (1993, pp.41-43; 2015, pp. 819-829) and 
Palairet (1979), our analysis suggests that there were political economy 
motives behind this change in the pattern of taxation. To be more precise, 
the extension of voting franchise to all males above the age of 21, in 1864, 
established the rural population as the unambiguous political majority, 
and resulted in a shift of tax policy in favour of this population group. 
Losses in tax revenues were mostly covered by increases in indirect taxes 
that were not harmful in political terms, since the large majority of the 
agricultural population could evade indirect taxes through self-
consumption. According to Dertilis (2015, pp 789-790), the major priority 
of the elected governments (but also of the Crown), at least during the 
first decades after independence, was to legitimize their authority. To this 
end, they mainly focused on policies that aimed to ensure a minimum 
level of social consensus and to convince the citizens of the young Greek 
state – the vast majority of whom were living in rural areas – that the 
public demands of the war of independence, i.e., “social justice”, 
“democracy”, and “equality of political rights”, would be satisfied. 
Moreover, the policy decision to increase indirect taxes was compatible 
with the weak administrative capabilities and the narrow tax collection 
capacity of the Greek state during that period11. 
                                                 
11 In other words, our analysis does not suggest that the Greek governments decided to increase custom 
duties solely due to political economy reasons. Countries characterized by poor fiscal capacity and low 
administrative capabilities tend to rely heavier on international trade taxes, since the latter are a more 
easy-to-collect-tax (see e.g., Besley and Persson, 2011, 2013). This argument is valid for the case of the 
Greek economy during the first decades after independence. However, this rationale, which does not 
consider political economy motivation, fails to provide a clear-cut explanation for the decision of the 
Greek governments to reduce land taxes in the first place. After all, even though land taxes were a more 
difficult-to-collect tax, there is no economic argument suggesting their amazing reduction after 
democratisation. 
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For comparison purposes, we also explore the effect of democratisation 
on taxation for a sample of 12 other European countries. Our empirical 
findings suggest that total tax revenues (% of GDP) are positively 
correlated with democratisation, along the lines of the Meltzer and 
Richard (1981) model, but only when the agricultural sector is significantly 
low. Concerning the effect of democracy on the composition of tax 
revenues, democratisation is negatively correlated with the share of direct 
(i.e., income taxes) to indirect taxes (i.e., custom duties and excises duties) 
when the percentage of workforce occupied in agriculture is close to the 
case of Greece (~70%). This effect is reversed gradually and becomes 
positive and significant when the agricultural sector drops below a certain 
threshold (~38%). These findings for Europe are compatible with previous 
empirical studies investigating similar issues (see e.g., Aidt and Jensen, 
2009b). In line with our theoretical priors, the demand for investment in 
human capital as the level of development increases, along with the effect 
of this investment on the tax collection capacity of the state, allows 
democratically elected governments to gradually rely more heavily on 
direct forms of taxation and to increase the level of government taxation.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data 
and presents a brief history of taxation in Greece. Section 3 presents the 
empirical specification. Section 4 discusses the empirical results for Greece 
and Section 5 presents the corresponding empirical findings for the 
sample of 12 Western European countries. Finally, Section 6 summarizes 
the main points. 
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2.  Data and Summary Statistics 
2.1. Fiscal Data 
Dertilis (1993, pp.105-297) was the first to attempt development of a 
detailed historical tax database for Greece. After 10 years of personal 
research, Dertilis tracked 89 fiscal accounts of the Greek state for the 
period 1833-1933. His research concluded with 12 missing accounts for 
the following years: 1850, 1851, 1856, 1857, 1863, 1907, and 1914-1919. 
Moreover, it should be noted that for the years 1845-1849, 1860, and 
1867, Dertilis (1993, pp.105-297) employed data from provisional fiscal 
accounts (i.e., Genikoi Logarismoi), instead of final fiscal accounts (i.e., 
Apologismoi) of the Greek state, since the latter were missing. In turn, 
Dertilis (1993, pp.125-171) applied a methodology along the lines of Flora 
et al. (1983) in order to classify the obtained 275 different types of taxes 
into the following 13 broad categories: (1) land tax, (2) assessed tax, (3) 
trade tax, (4) corporation tax, (5) income tax, (6) property tax, (7) 
inheritance tax, (8) extraordinary tax, (9) other direct tax, (10) customs 
tax, (11) excise tax, (12) turnover tax, and (13) other indirect tax12.  
According to this classification, direct taxes include categories (1) to (9), 
whereas indirect taxes include categories (10) to (13)13. All fiscal data are 
based on central government accounts. This is not a major shortcoming, 
since during that period local governments were underdeveloped. 
                                                 
12 For more details about the classification of the obtained 275 different types of taxes into the 13 broad 
tax categories, see Dertilis (1993), pp. 189–203. It is worth noting that income taxes (i.e., category (5)) 
can be further decomposed into payroll and non-payroll taxes. 
13 All variables are expressed in Drachma, the currency of Greece during the 19th and 20th centuries, in 
Pounds Sterling and as a percentage of total taxation. In order to make available for future research the 
original archival material, George Dertilis has donated two complete sets of photocopies to the 
Historical Archives of the University of Athens and of the National Bank of Greece. 
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Moreover, it allows us to compare the case of Greece with that of 12 
other European countries that were democratised during the 19th or early 
20th centuries, for which more data are available at the central rather 
than the general government level (see Flora et al., 1983). 
In a subsequent period, Prontzas et al. (2011) managed to track all the 
final fiscal accounts of the Greek state for the period under consideration, 
except for the year 1860. We tracked down the account for that year in 
the Historical Archives of the National Bank of Greece. For the newly 
tracked final fiscal accounts, we applied the methodology followed by 
Dertilis (1993, pp.125-171) so as to cover the missing observations in 
Dertilis’ (1993) database, and/or to replace tax data calculated through 
provisional fiscal accounts. Therefore, our final tax database contains 
homogeneous information from the final fiscal accounts of the Greek state 
during the full period of 1833-1933. 
Our analysis seeks to investigate the effects of democratisation on the size 
and the composition of tax revenues in Greece during the 19th and the 
beginning of the 20th centuries. To this end, we develop the variable total 
tax, which is defined as the sum of all tax categories (i.e., (1) to (13)) as a 
percentage of GDP. Data for GDP are taken from Kostelenos et al. (2007), 
who managed to compose reliable estimates of the magnitude of the 
Greek economy for the period of 1830-1939. Next, we construct the 
variable direct/indirect, which is defined as the ratio of direct taxes (i.e., 
categories (1) to (9)) to indirect taxes (i.e., categories (10) to (13)) and 
captures issues related to the pattern of taxation.  
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To further investigate the distributional implications of democratisation 
through tax burdens, following the methodology of Dertilis (1993, pp.125-
171), we develop the following variables, all expressed as a percentage of 
total taxes. First, the variable rural taxes is defined as the summation of 
land taxes and assessed taxes (i.e., categories (1) and (2)). This 
classification is based on the fact that both tax categories were imposed 
on land and/or earnings from agricultural and livestock production. 
Second, the variable urban taxes is the summation of the remaining direct 
tax instruments (i.e., categories (3) to (9)). Third, we attempt to obtain 
more detailed information regarding the composition of urban taxes by 
developing the following four sub-categories. We separate tax revenues 
levied on personal income (i.e., category (5)) into: (i) payroll taxes, which 
include tax revenues from labour income, and (ii) non-payroll taxes, which 
reflect revenues from other forms of income taxation. Moreover, we 
define the summation of tax categories (3) and (4) as trade and 
corporation taxes and the summation of tax categories (6) and (7) as 
capital taxes. The former tax category consists of taxes on earnings of 
small firms and the profits of enterprises affecting mostly the non-
agricultural income in urban areas, whereas the latter is composed of 
taxes on property, legacies, and donations that mostly affected high 
income agents. As denoted by its title, we expect urban tax instruments to 
burden more heavily or entirely the citizens of urban centres. Of course, 
we cannot exclude the possibility that some of the rural taxes can burden 
urban citizens, or vice versa. For instance, residents of the cities who 
owned land in rural areas were also paying rural taxes. Bearing this caveat 
in mind, it is important to note that the distinct separation of the rural and 
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urban population over the period 1833-1933 results only in limited cases 
that fall within this category. Finally, concerning indirect taxation, we 
construct the variable customs taxes (i.e., category (10)) and the variable 
market taxes as the summation of excise taxes, turnover taxes, and other 
indirect taxes (i.e., categories (11) to (13)). 
2.2. Data on the political regime 
The main explanatory variable of our study is a dichotomous variable 
developed by Boix et al. (2013) that takes the value of 1 if Greece is 
categorized as democratic and 0 otherwise. The key political factors that 
Boix et al. (2013) considered in order to codify a period as democratic are: 
(1) popular elections of the executive and legislature; (2) multiple parties 
competing in the election; (3) unconsolidated incumbent advantage; and 
(4) at least half of the male electorate is enfranchised. According to these 
criteria, Greece is classified as democratic over the periods 1864-1914 and 
1926-1933, and as autocratic in the periods 1833-1863 and 1915-1925.  
During the first decade after independence (1833-1843), the political 
regime was a monarchy under the reign of King Otto14. Only after the 
insurrection of 1843, which was led by Athenian garrisons backed by the 
demands of the Greek oligarchy, was the ruler compelled to adopt a 
constitution establishing a political regime of constitutional monarchy. 
Remarkably, Greece was among the first three countries of the world who 
granted voting rights to almost all adult males aged 25 years old and 
                                                 
14 Actually, until Otto reach the majority of age (June 1, 1835), his sovereign rights in Greece were 
exercised by the so-called regency, which was made up of three councils appointed by the Bavarian king. 
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over15. However, the case of Greece differs from that of the other 
European countries that also extended the voting franchise during the 19th 
century, for at least two reasons. Primarily, despite the adoption of 
universal male suffrage, the new constitution was monarchical, with all 
executive and legislative powers vested in the King. Second, this massive 
franchise reform did not occur as a result of the threat of revolution from 
the masses, as a large strand of the relevant literature suggests (see e.g., 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; Aidt and Jensen, 2014), but it was basically 
the result of the absence of a dominant, cohesive elite faction that would 
be able to impose a clear-cut authoritarian solution. More precisely, the 
political environment consisted of evenly balanced elite factions – all with 
privileged access to the rural population through patronage networks – 
that viewed enfranchisement of the illiterate rural population (~90%) as a 
good system of adjudicating their conflicts, while restricting the power of 
the King, who was the most powerful actor up to that point (see Alivizatos, 
2011; Kalyvas, 2015, pp.50-52)16.  
In 1862, King Otto was overthrown by a rising of the guard and the people 
of Athens. A series of events led to the appointment of a new monarch, 
George I, and after long debates the new constitution in 1864 established 
a democracy under a King with universal suffrage for all males aged 21 
years old and over. According to the new constitution, instead of a ballot, 
                                                 
15 Only paying guests or apprentices were excluded from this right. The other two countries that 
adopted universal male suffrage before Greece were France and Liberia (see Przeworski, 2009). In 
France, it was introduced with the constitution of 1793, but it never went into effect and no elections 
were held under it. Although Liberia proceeded in universal male suffrage in 1839, voting rights were 
restricted again in 1847. 
16 According to Przeworski (2006), a political environment of evenly balanced elite factions is a sine qua 
non for a stable, self-enforcing democratic regime. In other words, democracy survives only when all the 
political forces that could overthrow it agree that democratic elections are a good system of 
adjudicating their conflicts or at least are preferable over the feasible alternatives. 
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voters could cast a small lead ball into one of the ballot boxes allocated to 
each one of the candidates standing for elections. This innovation 
facilitated voting by illiterate agents, who were the vast majority of the 
population during that period, without the intervention of local actors 
(Alivizatos, 2011). After 1864, gradually, two broad political tendencies 
were formed, the liberal and the conservative. Moreover, despite some 
incidents of political instability, parliamentary governments functioned 
regularly for many decades. In 1911, after the military movement of 1909 
that brought Eleftherios Venizelos in office, a liberal constitutional reform 
took place. The new constitution was characterised by greater protection 
of human rights, the rule of law, and the modernisation of institutions.  
Thus, although Greece has been classified as being an autocratic regime 
during 1833-1863, the constitutions of 1864 and 1911 allowed Greece to 
be transformed during 1864-1914, developing institutional characteristics 
identical to those of other democratic countries of that period. However, 
disagreements between King Constantine, who succeeded King George 
after his assassination in 1913, and the Prime Minister Eleftherios 
Venizelos initiated a prolonged period of political instability. According to 
the Boix et al. (2013) classification, Greece has been categorized as being 
autocratic during the period of 1915-1925. This categorization is based on 
Greece’s experience of a deep National Schism and two military coups in 
1922 and 1925, each lasting two years. From 1926 until 1933, the 
remaining years of our sample, political stability was restored and Greece 
once again is classified as democratic. As an alternative proxy of 
democracy, we also employ the variable polity2 as obtained from the 
Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010). 
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2.3. A brief history of rural taxation in Greece 
Although after the war of independence the tax system of the new-born 
Greek state was modified, its most basic characteristics were similar to 
those established by the Ottoman Empire (see e.g., Shaw, 1975; 
McGowan, 1981). First, the basic component of rural taxation, the so-
called dekati, which was a 10% tax on gross agricultural and livestock 
production, remained untouched17. In many cases, this tax was paid in 
kind (i.e., by providing agricultural goods) instead of cash, since the Greek 
economy was an agrarian, almost barter, economy (especially in the rural 
areas). A second characteristic of the tax system was the delegation of tax 
collection through tax auctions. According to this practice, incumbents 
kept the monopoly of the “power to tax”, but they delegated to local 
elites the right to collect physical tax revenues (i.e., in kind revenues) and 
in turn to merchandise obtained agricultural goods in order to obtain cash 
(see Petmezas, 2003)18. In this way, tax renters ensured tax revenues in 
cash to the Greek authorities19. 
During the first years after independence (1833-1844), as already 
mentioned, the peasantry was paying 10% of their gross agricultural and 
                                                 
17 However, it should be noted that a large number of Ottoman lump sum taxes on peasants and 
farmers (such as ispence and avariz) were abolished. For a detailed analysis of the taxation in Ottoman 
Empire, see McGowan (1981). 
18 For the majority of the agricultural goods, dekati was paid in kind. However, for some specific types of 
agricultural goods (such as cotton, tobacco, and vines) that could be exported to international markets, 
dekati was paid in cash and consequently there was no need for tax auctions. For most of these goods, 
starting in 1845, Greek governments replaced dekati with the so called stremmatiki forologia, which was 
based on the extent of the cultivated land (see Dertilis, 1993; Petmezas, 2003). 
19 During the war of independence (1822-1833) rich members of local notables were competing in 
auctions by offering amounts of money to the authorities as payments in advance. The winners had the 
right to collect the physical tax revenues that were agricultural goods, and in turn to sell them to the 
domestic market and mostly in urban areas. After independence, the structure of tax auctions changed 
significantly to that described above and payments in advance reduced. 
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livestock production as tax (dekati), whereas an additional 15% of their 
gross production was going to rents if the cultivated land was granted by 
the Greek state (the so-called epikarpia)20. Moreover, if public lands were 
used without permission from the Greek governments, they were obliged 
to pay an additional 15% of gross agricultural production as epikarpia. 
Thus, the overall tax burden on land was ranging between 25-40% of gross 
agricultural and livestock production. (1993, pp.41-43; 2015, pp 819-829) 
suggests that the gradual reduction of the tax burden fallen on land, that 
started in 1845 and became more radical after 1864, can be attributed to 
the franchise extensions that took place during that period and increased 
the political power of the rural population.  
More precisely, after the insurrection of 1843, and the constitution of 
1844, a new tax law was voted in 1845. According to the new tax 
legislation, land rent paid for public lands (epikarpia) was reduced to a 
level of 10%, irrespective of whether public lands were cultivated with or 
without permission from the Greek state. Therefore, the overall tax 
burden on land was decreased to a level of 20%. For this reason, as can be 
seen in Table 1, the percentage of rural taxes decreased from 66.44% the 
period of 1833-1843, to 57.2% for the period after the reform and before 
the new constitution of 1864 was voted in. Moreover, after 1864, both 
dekati and stremmatiki forologia (i.e., taxation based on the extent of the 
cultivated land) reduced significantly. It must be noted that during the 
                                                 
20 After independence, in practice, Greek governments nationalized the great bulk of lands that 
belonged to Ottoman landowners. More precisely, although the Treaty of Constantinople had protected 
the land property rights of Ottoman individuals and institutions, in practice, Greek governments 
tolerated transactions and practices that were detrimental to these rights. Eventually, Greece 
nationalized these lands as a temporary measure, but it took almost half century before the first 
extensive land redistribution in 1871.  
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same period there were also significant efforts from the Greek 
governments aiming to fully abolish dekati, which finally took place in 
188021. Following a similar political rationale, from 1880 until the first two 
decades of the 20th century, most of the Greek governments implemented 
tax reforms that were based on reductions of several direct taxes paid by 
the agricultural population (see e.g., Sideris, 1931), dramatically 
decreasing the percentage of rural taxes at levels below 25%, as can be 
seen in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Tax revenues of the Greek state over four time periods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Period total taxes direct/indirect rural taxes urban taxes custom taxes market taxes 
1833-1843 15.21 2.18 66.44 1.76 24.31 7.50 
1844-1863 11.48 1.50 57.20 2.18 27.09 13.53 
1864-1915 12.99 0.46 23.67 6.22 39.33 30.78 
1916-1933 17.70 0.41 9.74 18.66 32.64 38.97 
 
 
2.4 Changes in the composition of taxation due to decreases in rural 
taxation 
2.4.1 Changes in indirect taxation 
Decreases in rural taxation that took place from 1843 to 1880 were 
accompanied by amazing increases in indirect taxes. Thus, although total 
tax revenues (as a share of GDP) remained relatively constant during that 
period, the composition of tax revenues altered significantly22,23. Until 
                                                 
21 In 1860, Koumoundouros, the minister of finance of the Greek state, proposed a tax law, according to 
which dekati would be fully replaced by a tax system based on the extent of the cultivated land. A 
similar reform was proposed by Sotiropoulos, a subsequent finance minister, in 1867. Both tax laws 
failed to become laws of the Greek state (see Sideris, 1931), since they were blocked mainly by the 
politically powerful group of tax renters who had the right to collect in kind revenues and merchandise 
through the obtained agricultural goods (Kostis, 2006).  
22 To be more precise, from 1833 to 1863 total tax revenues (% of GDP) decreased from about 15% to 
11.5%, and in turn from 1864 to 1915 they remained relatively constant at a level of about 12-13%. 
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1884, most of these indirect taxes were basically custom taxes and other 
indirect taxes (e.g., stamp duty on legal documents). Then, in 1884, 
Charilaos Trikoupis implemented a tax reform that introduced a large 
number of excises duties – actually taxes on consumption – and at the 
same time significantly increased the revenues from state monopolies 
(see e.g., Kostis, 2006, pp.312-313). As can be easily verified in columns (5) 
and (6) of Table 1, the summation of custom taxes and market taxes 
increased significantly in the years after the first big political reform in 
1844, and even more rapidly after 1864. Changes in rural taxes and 
indirect taxation are also reflected in the evolution of the ratio 
direct/indirect taxes that seems to decrease constantly during the whole 
period (see column (2) of Table 1). 
Economic theory suggests that indirect taxation affects in a similar way 
the high and the low-income agents and hence it is considered a 
regressive tax instrument. However, in the case of the Greek economy 
during the 19th century, there was an additional distributional implication 
since the Greek economy was an agrarian economy characterized by high 
levels of self-consumption especially in the rural areas. Thus, the rural 
population was able to evade indirect taxes through self-consumption and 
was not affected to a great extent by this type of taxes24. In contrast, 
                                                                                                                                               
23 Increased fiscal needs during the first years after independence were mostly handled through 
international borrowing. More precisely, from 1824-1825 the Greek revolutionary government decided 
to get a loan of 70 million golden francs from abroad, then in 1833 King Otto added an international 
loan of 60 million golden francs (see e.g., Dertilis, 2016, pp.31-34). Major investments on fiscal capacity 
took place much later, especially when the Greek state faced important military challenges requiring 
increased tax revenues (i.e., before the Balkan Wars and WWI). This is in line with the theoretical 
predictions of Tilly (1990) and Dincecco and Prado (2012), who suggest that military competition 
promoted fiscal innovations that enabled states to raise even larger tax amounts. 
24 According to Dertilis (1993, pp.159-164), self-consumption is estimated around 60-70% of rural 
income during the 19th century.  
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indirect taxes affected, though not homogenously, the population that 
was living in urban regions, since a large number of basic goods consumed 
(such as wheat, textiles, and energy producing raw materials) were 
imported from abroad (see Dertilis, 2015, pp.1169-1171). In particular, 
increases in custom duties substantially harmed the welfare of poor urban 
citizens, since the option of self-consumption was not available, but did 
not considerably affect the most privileged parts of the urban population. 
The introduction of excises duties from Trikoupis in 1884 presented similar 
distributional implications between rural and urban areas, causing the 
poorer segments of the urban population to be the clear-cut losers from 
this change in fiscal policy. 
 
2.4.2 Changes in urban taxation 
Another basic characteristic of the Greek tax system was the full absence 
of personal income taxation until 191025. Investigating the composition of 
direct taxes from 1833 to 1910, several scholars have concluded that the 
amazing drop in rural taxes was accompanied by moderate increases in, or 
introduction of, other forms of direct taxation that fell within the 
categories of trade and corporate taxes and capital taxes (see e.g., Dertilis, 
1993, pp.33-35). A good example is the introduction of the corporate tax 
rate in 1877, which contributed, on average, less than 0.5% of annual tax 
revenues. Therefore, despite these changes, the radical decrease in rural 
                                                 
25 In sharp contrast, many other European countries established the personal income tax during the 19th 
century. More precisely, in 1842 Britain introduced a permanent tax on earned income. This was soon 
after followed by the Austrian Empire in 1849, Italy in 1864, Norway in 1892, and the Netherlands in 
1899. In most of these countries, revenues from income tax reached 5% of total tax revenues shortly 
after the year of adoption of the new tax (see Aidt and Jensen, 2009a). 
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taxes after 1864 dominated, leading to a constant decrease in the 
percentage of direct taxes from 53.95% in 1864 to 20.44% in 1910. 
In 1911, Eleftherios Venizelos introduced the first modern personal 
income tax. However, its tax rate was flat and small and tax evasion was 
so large that tax revenues from personal income taxation were 
insignificant until 1918. Its share exceeded 5% in 1919, and increased 
gradually thereafter. This was the main reason that the percentage of 
urban taxes increased from 6.22% during the period of 1864-1915 to 
18.66% the remaining years of our sample. This change also affected the 
overall level of total taxes that increased from 13% before 1915 to 17.99% 
after that year (see Table 1). Notably, most of these personal income tax 
revenues came from labour income taxation (i.e., payroll tax) and a much 
smaller amount from other forms of income taxation (i.e., non-payroll 
tax). As can be easily understood, the payroll tax mostly harmed the 
welfare of the workers that were working in small firms and corporations 
established in urban regions, whereas they left relatively unaffected the 
peasantry of the countryside. 
 
3. Empirical Specification 
 
 
Our goal in this study is to investigate whether the observed reductions in 
rural taxes (and the corresponding increases in indirect taxes) can be 
attributed to the political changes of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th 
centuries, with priority of course in the radical reform of 1864. To test the 
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fiscal outcomes of democratisation in Greece, we estimate the following 
equation for the period of 1833-1933: 
 
   (1) 
 
where  stands for fiscal indicators, as described in section 2.1; 
 is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if Greece is categorized 
as democratic in year t, according to the Boix et al. (2013) dichotomous 
classification, and 0 otherwise;  is the vector of control to be discussed 
below;  is a trend that measures the effect of time on the dependent 
variable; and  is the error term. In all specifications, in line with many 
previous studies (see e.g., Aidt et al., 2006), we include a lagged 
dependent variable on the right-hand side of our estimated equation to 
control for the fact that the evolution of tax policy exhibits a high degree 
of persistence.  
Moreover, our empirical specification includes a number of covariates that 
are expected to affect fiscal policy. First, we consider the variable GDP per 
capita, the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita, to control for the 
effect of economic development on the level and composition of taxation 
(see Wagner, 1883). Related to that, we expect the structure of the 
economy, and more specifically the reliance on agricultural activity, to be 
a crucial determinant of the various tax bases and how taxes are levied. 
For this reason, we employ the percentage of population living in cities of 
less than two thousand people (denoted as agricultural rate), as proxy for 
the relative magnitude of the agricultural sector. Second, we employ the 
variable old, which is defined as the percentage of the population aged 65 
  21 
 
or older. According to Lindert (1994), the ageing of the population 
significantly increased the demand for intergenerational redistribution in 
Europe during the period of 1880-1930. Therefore, we expect a positive 
relationship between age structure and the level of government spending. 
A number of dummy variables are also included in our empirical 
specification. We intended to use the population size in order to control 
for the possibility that the public sector exhibits economies of scale (see, 
e.g., Mulligan et al., 2004; Aidt et al., 2006). However, we abstain from 
using this variable in our specification since it is highly correlated with the 
variable agricultural rate. Instead, we construct the dummy variable 
population spikes, which takes the value of 1 in the years that we observe 
significant increases in the population (e.g., annexation of regions), and 0 
otherwise. Our next covariates allow us to control for the impact of 
economic crises on the implementation of fiscal policy in Greece. The 
variables debt crisis and currency crisis take the value of 1 if a debt 
(domestic or external) or a currency crisis, respectively, occurred during 
the year, and 0 otherwise. Finally, we include two dummy variables to 
control for the pressure of internal instability and wars on the 
implementation of fiscal policy. Appendix A1 provides descriptions, data 
sources, and descriptive statistics for all variables included in our 
regressions analysis in Section 4.  
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4. Results 
 
4.1 Baseline Results 
 
Our baseline results are reported in Table 2. In column (1), the main 
variable of interest, Democracy, bears a non-significant effect on the 
variable total taxes. This finding appears to be in contrast with the 
standard Meltzer and Richard (1981) framework, but it is in line with 
previous historical studies for Greece (see Dertilis and Kostis, 1995; Kostis, 
2006, pp.307-316) suggesting that total tax revenues remained relatively 
stable during the 19th century. In contrast, in column (2) the variable 
Democracy enters with a negative and statistically significant coefficient at 
the 5% level. This empirical finding demonstrates that democratisation 
exerts a significant impact on the structure of taxation.  
Moreover, when direct taxes are decomposed between rural taxes and 
urban taxes in columns (3) and (4), respectively, we see that Democracy 
has a negative and highly significant coefficient in the former, whereas no 
effect is found on the latter. On top of that, in column (5) to (8), where 
urban taxes are further disaggregated between (1) payroll taxes, (2) non-
payroll taxes, (3) trade and corporate taxes, and (4) capital taxes, 
democratisation seems to exert a positive and statistically significant 
impact solely on payroll taxes. In particular, in column (5), Democracy 
enters with a positive and highly significant coefficient, indicating the 
positive effect of democratisation on personal income taxes from labour 
income. Finally, in columns (8) and (9), we investigate the impact of 
democratisation on the composition of indirect taxes. As can be seen, 
Democracy bears a positive coefficient in both customs taxes and market 
taxes at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 2. Fiscal effects of Democratization in Greece 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent variable: total taxes direct/indirect rural taxes urban taxes payroll taxes non-payroll 
taxes 
trade and corp.  
taxes 
capital taxes customs taxes market taxes 
Democracy 0.281 -0.123** -4.571*** -1.145 0.624*** 0.043 -0.040 -0.457 4.530** 1.940* 
 (0.652) (0.051) (1.692) (1.204) (0.157) (0.155) (0.302) (0.325) (1.851) (1.071) 
lagged dependent variable 0.814*** 0.478*** 0.446*** 0.788*** 0.583*** 0.634*** 0.160 0.500*** 0.636*** 0.932*** 
 (0.066) (0.098) (0.109) (0.123) (0.163) (0.103) (0.176) (0.123) (0.081) (0.044) 
GDP per capita -0.179 0.465 3.657 0.186 -0.077 0.234 -0.180 0.041 -4.034 2.868 
 (1.445) (0.286) (3.876) (1.257) (0.253) (0.151) (0.545) (0.654) (3.333) (2.082) 
agricultural rate -0.166 -0.024 -0.067 0.006 -0.174*** -0.018 0.197*** 0.205** 0.291 -0.268 
 (0.157) (0.017) (0.379) (0.250) (0.058) (0.038) (0.055) (0.082) (0.372) (0.214) 
old 0.495 0.126 1.169 1.232** 0.327** 0.143** -0.172 -0.029 0.092 -0.663 
 (0.465) (0.077) (1.069) (0.491) (0.125) (0.059) (0.140) (0.134) (0.939) (0.649) 
population spikes -0.591 0.010 0.178 -0.964 -0.208 -0.041 -0.203 0.253 1.813 -0.848 
 (0.655) (0.064) (1.603) (1.706) (0.179) (0.092) (0.213) (0.360) (3.524) (1.150) 
debt crisis -0.990* 0.027 3.092*** -0.397 0.173 0.184* -0.306** 0.296* -0.202 -0.600 
 (0.567) (0.041) (1.070) (0.388) (0.109) (0.099) (0.136) (0.166) (1.141) (0.819) 
currency crisis 0.015 -0.195*** -2.297 -7.645*** 1.538** 0.785*** -0.314 -0.333 6.113** 4.455*** 
 (0.746) (0.043) (1.397) (2.768) (0.748) (0.293) (0.423) (0.534) (2.678) (1.288) 
internal instability -2.882*** -0.063 0.454 -1.482 -0.028 -0.095 0.481 0.104 -0.759 3.012* 
 (0.815) (0.062) (1.342) (0.948) (0.126) (0.084) (0.400) (0.363) (1.998) (1.539) 
wars -0.259 0.018 0.021 0.813 0.067 0.026 0.069 -0.437* -1.374 0.049 
 (0.538) (0.045) (1.407) (0.612) (0.144) (0.074) (0.269) (0.240) (1.494) (0.865) 
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
R2 0.897 0.920 0.975 0.925 0.939 0.898 0.784 0.823 0.776 0.975 
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates All estimates include an intercept and a time trend. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and *denotes 
significance at 10% level. 
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Our empirical findings suggest that the swift in the political regime led to 
significant changes in the tax structure, and more precisely to fiscal 
redistribution from urban to rural areas. This is because democratisation 
reduced rural taxes (i.e., land and assessed taxes), which were the basic 
tax categories that burdened the agricultural population in the 
countryside. It must be noted that since Greece was characterized by a 
relatively equal distribution of land during that period, decreases in rural 
taxes did not exhibit significant distributional implications between small 
farmers and large landowners26. At the same time, increases in custom 
taxes and market taxes that also came as a result of democratisation 
were also in favour of the rural population and at the expense of the 
urban population because the rural population was able to evade 
indirect taxes through self-consumption, whereas the population in 
urban regions, including its poorer segments, did not exhibit such an 
option (see Dertilis, 1993). Moreover, our analysis suggests that high 
income agents of the cities were not significantly affected by the policies 
implemented after democratisation, as indicated by the effect of the 
latter on the main components of urban taxes, namely trade and 
corporate taxes and capital taxes. The only urban tax category that 
seems to be affected positively after the franchise reform is payroll 
taxes, a sub-component of income tax. However, the share of this tax 
remained at low levels after its introduction in 1911, and most 
                                                 
26 In practice, Greek governments nationalized the great bulk of lands that had belonged to Ottoman 
landowners after independence. 
  25 
 
importantly this tax mostly affected the welfare of the working class of 
the cities.  
It should be noted that the fiscal effects of democratisation are 
consistent with our theoretical priors, given that Greece was a severely 
underdeveloped economy –much behind the other European economies 
– without significant fiscal capacity that would allow for replacing the 
decreasing rural taxes with other forms of direct taxation. We observe 
instead that rural taxes were replaced with indirect taxes, changing the 
composition of taxation but leaving the overall level of total taxes 
unaffected. Overall, this shift in fiscal policy after democratisation 
indicates that the rural population, as opposed to the low-income agents 
of the cities who could not evade indirect taxes, was favoured, whereas 
the wealthiest citizens of Greece were left untouched. More 
importantly, these findings clearly demonstrate the political economy 
motivation of the Greek governments that altered the composition of 
taxation to ensure a minimum level of social consensus and to satisfy the 
large majority of the voters who were peasants and farmers living in 
rural areas (see Dertilis, 1993, 2004; Palairet, 1979)27. 
We also estimate the long-run effect of democratisation on fiscal policy 
instruments. To do so, the coefficient of the variable Democracy  
from equation (1) should be divided by , where  is the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. According to our estimates, 
                                                 
27 Consistent with this argument, Kammas and Sarantides (2016) show that when the democratic 
regime is not fully consolidated (i.e., in a new democracy), incumbents implement pre-electoral 
redistributive policies in order to signal that “democracy works”, thereby preventing a reversion to an 
autocratic status quo ante at a time of the regime’s extreme vulnerability. Similarly, Brender and 
Drazen (2007) suggest that the attitude of the citizenry towards democracy is important in preventing 
democratic collapse, and fiscal manipulation can act as an instrument to convince them that 
"democracy works". 
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the change in the composition of taxation in favour of indirect taxes is 
driven mainly by the long-run decrease in the share of rural taxes by 
8.25%, and by the long-run increase in the share of customs taxes by 
12.46%. Given that the mean value of the former is 32.48% and of the 
latter is 34.07%, it is clear that this effect is quantitatively sizable. 
Interestingly, the significant short-run effect of democratisation on 
market taxes does not seem to survive in the long-run. More specifically, 
the high degree of persistence in market taxes generates a sizeable long-
run effect of democratisation (28.5%), which is though statistically 
insignificant. 
To close, we discuss our empirical findings concerning the rest of the 
covariates reported in Table 2. First, as expected, the lagged dependent 
variable bears a positive and statistically significant coefficient in all but 
one of our estimates28. Moreover, we observed that the variables that 
capture the level of economic development, namely GDP per capita and 
agricultural rate, enter with non-significant coefficients in most of the 
specifications. As expected, the variable debt crisis decreases the size of 
tax revenues, whereas the variable currency crisis is found to decrease 
the share of direct to indirect taxes mainly through its negative impact 
on urban taxes. Finally, the variable internal instability deteriorates the 
level of tax revenues, while the variable wars negatively affects the 
share of capital taxes.  
 
                                                 
28 To assess if the high degree of persistence of some of our estimates can affect the interpretation of 
our results, we transformed equation (1) to an Error Correction Model. The qualitative and 
quantitative results we obtain for the long-run effect of democratisation on fiscal instruments are 
essentially the same as those obtained from the estimates in Table 2. 
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4.2. Sensitivity analysis 
 
In this section, we examine the robustness of the results obtained in 
Table 2. As a first step, we examine if our findings are sensitive to the 
dichotomous variable we employed so far to measure Democracy. More 
precisely, in Table 3 we substitute Boix et al.’s (2013) measure with the 
variable Polity2 from the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010)29. 
This index has been applied as a tool to classify political regimes 
(democracy versus autocracy) in a large number of studies (see e.g., 
Haber and Menaldo, 2011; Harrison and Wolf, 2012), though a closer 
look at it suggests that it mainly focuses on the institutional side of 
political competition (see, Vanhanen, 2000). However, it offers the 
advantage of varying from -10 (extreme autocracy) to +10 (perfect 
democracy), thus allowing for more variation in the sample. Moreover, 
in the case of Greece, the sharp changes in the index coincide with 
institutional changes that affected all aspects of the political regime. As 
shown in panel A of Table 3, our empirical findings remain qualitatively 
identical to those depicted in Table 2. More precisely, we observe a 
negative impact of Polity2 on the ratio of direct to indirect taxes, which 
is mainly driven by changes in the composition of taxation between rural 
and indirect taxes. Interestingly, we also observe a negative effect on 
capital taxes, a small component of direct taxation levied mostly on the 
wealthiest citizens of Greece. 
                                                 
29 This variable has missing values for the years 1916-1919. To avoid any loss of information from our 
sample, we bridge this gap by replacing the missing observations with the value 1, which is the value 
Polity2 receives the years just before and after the gap period, namely the years 1915 and 1920. 
Alternatively, we run our estimates without this modification and our results, which are available 
upon request, remain essentially the same. 
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Table 3. Fiscal effects of Democratization in Greece: Robustness checks 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent 
variable: 
total 
taxes 
direct/indi
rect  
rural taxes urban 
taxes 
payroll 
taxes 
non-
payroll 
taxes 
trade 
and 
corp. 
taxes 
capital 
taxes 
customs 
taxes 
market 
taxes 
Panel A: Using alternative measure of democracy        
           
Polity2 -0.002 -0.011** -0.425*** -0.160 0.067*** 0.006 -0.012 -0.054* 0.410*** 0.161* 
 (0.057) (0.005) (0.160) (0.118) (0.017) (0.015) (0.026) (0.031) (0.136) (0.086) 
Observations  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
R2 0.897 0.920 0.975 0.926 0.943 0.898 0.785 0.829 0.777 0.975 
           
Panel B: Testing for outliers         
           
Democracy 0.499 -0.100** -2.470** -1.382** 0.467*** 0.289*** 0.012 -0.331** 3.740** 1.624* 
 (0.510) (0.040) (1.270) (0.693) (0.099) (0.033) (0.170) (0.165) (1.454) (0.847) 
Observations  93 95 95 95 97 93 95 94 93 94 
R2 0.930 0.970 0.985 0.982 0.991 0.989 0.891 0.932 0.855 0.983 
           
           
Panel C: Sample 1844-1915          
           
Democracy -1.402 -0.284** -11.047*** 0.331 - 0.071** 0.210 -0.230 5.315 6.323*** 
 (1.470) (0.134) (3.570) (0.317)  (0.029) (0.154) (0.294) (4.178) (2.118) 
Observations  72 72 72 72 - 72 72 72 72 72 
R2 0.752 0.900 0.963 0.949 - 0.834 0.919 0.895 0.760 0.976 
 
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. All models control for the lagged dependent variable, GDP per capita, agricultural rate, old, population spikes, debt 
crisis, currency crisis, internal instability, wars, but these coefficients are not reported to save space. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** 
denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. 
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Our next robustness check is to ensure that the results presented in Table 
2 are not influenced by outlier observations. For this reason, we rerun the 
estimates from Table 2 without observations with a standardized residual 
above 1.96 or below -1.96. As can be seen in panel B of Table 3, our 
results confirm our previous findings concerning the fiscal effects of 
democratisation in Greece30. The only notable difference is that, according 
to the results in column (6), non-payroll taxes seem to increase after 
democratisation. If we relate this result with the decrease in capital taxes, 
we have indications that part of the tax revenues that burdened affluent 
citizens before 1910 were transformed to non-payroll taxes after 1911, 
when income taxation was introduced. However, it should be noted that 
the overall share of both tax categories, capital taxes and non-payroll 
taxes, is disproportionally small to the tax bases on which they were 
levied. 
Finally, we check if our results continue to hold when restricting our 
sample between the years 1844 and 1915. Our motivation is twofold. 
First, as already mentioned, the first significant political reform that 
increased the political power of the agricultural population took place in 
Greece in 1844. Therefore, if our results in the restricted sample continue 
to hold, we demonstrate that the second more radical constitution of 
1864 is indeed the significant reform that drives our result. Second, we 
choose to limit our sample to prior to 1915, since until that year, the 
major instruments of direct taxation of the Greek state remained broadly 
the same. The two exceptions are the introduction of the corporate tax in 
                                                 
30 Our results remain essentially the same if, alternatively, we drop observations with a Cook’s distance 
larger than 4/n, where n is the number of observations.  
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1877 and that of the personal income tax in 1911. However, both taxes, 
until 1915, contributed an amount close to 1% of total tax revenues to the 
public budget. Therefore, limiting our sample until 1915 allows us to 
exclude the possibility that the negative effect found on rural taxes after 
1864 is driven by their replacement by other direct forms of taxation that 
potentially could have burdened the rural population. As can be seen in 
panel C of Table 3, our main results regarding the change in the level and 
composition of taxation after 1864 continue to hold. A notable 
expectation is that the effect of the reform seems even more detrimental 
to the share of direct to indirect taxes, mainly because its effect on rural 
taxes and market taxes is more than doubled in comparison to our 
baseline specification31. 
 
5. Fiscal Effects of Democratisation in Europe 
 
As already discussed, the structure of the Greek economy differs 
significantly from those of other European countries that democratised 
during the 19th or the beginning of the 20th century. To demonstrate this, 
in Figure 1 we depict the prevalence of the agricultural sector in Greece 
and eight other European countries for the year 1864 that we observe the 
big reform in Greece32.  It is evident that Greece is a notable case, since 
                                                 
31 We cannot obtain any estimates in the specification of column (5), since the payroll tax was 
introduced after 1915.  
32As already mentioned, for the case of Greece we proxy the size of the agricultural sector using the 
percentage of population living in cities of less than two thousand people, given that occupational 
statistics are not available from the beginning of our sample. However, as noted in footnote 7, the 
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upon democratisation, the agricultural sector dominates the economy 
(76%). In contrast, for the other European countries, on average, the 
workforce occupied in agriculture is 47.2%, which indicates that other 
sectors of the economy (e.g., industrial activity) were significantly more 
developed. Therefore, one important aspect of the Greek democratisation 
is that it can be characterised as premature, since it took place when the 
domestic economy was still purely agrarian. On top of that, most other 
European countries that were already significantly more developed than 
Greece in 1864 democratised much later chronologically (e.g., the UK). 
Figure 2 illustrates this point by plotting the prevalence of the agricultural 
sector upon democratisation, according to Boix et al.’s (2013) 
classification, for Greece and 12 other European countries33. Three points 
are worth noting about this Figure. First, the only country, according to 
Boix et al. (2013), that democratised before Greece, is Switzerland in 
1856, with almost 80% of the adult male population enfranchised (Flora et 
al., 1983). Second, and more importantly, the agricultural sector the year 
of democratisation for the sample of other European countries is half to 
that of Greece, namely 38%34. Third, it is evident that some countries (e.g., 
Finland and Italy) are closer to the Greek case, whereas other differ 
significantly. For instance, Sweden, which was already a more developed 
                                                                                                                                               
values of our proxy with that of the workforce occupied in the agricultural sector (%), in the first census 
that occupational statistics were reported in 1861, are essentially the same.  
33 The number of countries in the two figures is dictated by data availability.  
34 This difference between Greece and Europe is rather understated, if we consider that Boix et al.’s 
(2013) classification requires, among others, more than 50% of the male population to be enfranchised 
for a country to be qualified as democratic. In the case of Greece after the big voting reform in 1864 
almost 100% of the male population was granted voting rights. So, if we consider 100% of male 
population (or 50% of total population) as the threshold of democratisation for European countries as 
well, we move democratisation in many cases to much later chronologically, making the distance 
between Greece and Europe even more significant.     
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economy in 1864, democratised 47 years later than Greece in 1911, when 
the agricultural sector no longer dominates the economy.  
 
 
Figure 1. Workforce in Agriculture (%): Greece vs Europe in 1864 
 
 
Notes: In the parenthesis, next to the country name, the year of Greek democratisation is reported. 
Source, Boix et al. (2013). For Greece, we proxy for the workforce in agriculture (%) using the 
percentage of population that lives in cities of less than two thousand people, as obtained by Dertilis 
(1993). For all other European countries, the variable workforce in agriculture (%) is obtained from 
Banks and Wilson (2015).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Workforce in Agriculture (%): Greece vs Europe upon democratisation 
 
Notes: In the parenthesis, next to the country name, the year of democratisation is reported. Source, Boix 
et al. (2013). For the workforce in agriculture (%) statistics see Figure 1.  
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As can be seen in Figure 2, the European countries of our sample are 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. To test the 
effect of democratisation on fiscal outcomes for this group of countries, 
we estimate the following equation for the period 1841-193335: 
 
 (2) 
 
Where  is a fiscal indicator in country i in year 
t; is the respective lagged dependent variable36; 
is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if country i in year t is 
categorized as democratic, and 0 otherwise;  is the 
percentage of the workforce in agriculture;  is the vector of additional 
control variables; i and t correspond to country and time fixed effects, 
respectively, and it  is the error term. As can be seen, equation (1) has 
been augmented with the interaction term  
 , in order to test whether the phase of 
economic development and consequently the structure of the domestic 
                                                 
35 Although for some countries fiscal data are available from year 1833 onwards (e.g., UK, France), due 
to data limitations of other variables, our sample starts in 1841.  
36 The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable introduces a potential bias in the dynamic Fixed Effects 
model by not satisfying the strict exogeneity assumption of the error term εit. As shown in the literature, 
the estimated bias of this formulation is of order 1/T, where T is the time length of the panel, even as 
the number of countries becomes large (see, among others, Nickell, 1981). However, the average length 
of our panel ranges between 41 and 60 years in the different specifications making the bias negligible. 
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economy around the time of democratisation is a decisive determinant of 
the development of the tax system.  
According to the literature, the need for public investment in human 
capital to complement the production process upon and during 
industrialisation (Galor, 2005) is more likely to manifest in implemented 
fiscal policies when the poorer segments of the society are part of the 
democratic institutions (see Justman and Gradstein, 1999; Lizzeri and 
Persico, 2004; Aidt et al., 2010). Simultaneously, the provision of public 
education that increases the literacy rate of the domestic population 
works to improve the tax collection capacity of the state and the reliance 
on direct forms of taxation (see Aidt and Jensen, 2009b). Thus, as the level 
of development increases, democratically elected governments gradually 
should rely more heavily on direct forms of taxation that in turn can 
enlarge the level of government spending. 
The focus on the 12 European countries is due to the fact that Flora et al. 
(1983) provide directly comparable fiscal data to that employed for the 
case of Greece. Moreover, although these European countries had 
significant differences in the rules and institutions that governed fiscal 
policy during that period, they share similar economic and political 
characteristics that make them an appealing sample for panel analysis37. 
The tax variables that we employ in this section are identical to those of 
Section 4, with only one exception. In particular, Flora et al. (1983) do not 
provide a decomposition of income taxes to payroll and non-payroll taxes. 
For this reason, we are restricted to using the variable income taxes, 
                                                 
37 An obvious example is the case of Germany, where the central government reserved the right to levy 
and collect a significant amount of direct taxes close to the beginning of WWI (Ritschl, 2003). 
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which is defined as the percentage of income taxes to total tax revenues. 
In the few cases where tax data is missing, we fill in the gaps with linear 
interpolation (see e.g., Aidt et al., 2006). This strategy aims to maximize 
data coverage, but by no means has affected our qualitative results38. 
The same methodology has been applied, when needed, to the control 
variables, which choice of source has also been dictated by our priority to 
maximize data availability. We include the same controls as in Section 4, 
with only one exception39. More specifically, for the case of Greece we 
preferred the variable population spikes because the actual population 
size was highly correlated with the agricultural rate. However, in the case 
of European countries we do not face the same limitation. For this reason, 
we construct the variable population, which is defined as the natural 
logarithm of the population of the country. Appendix A2 provides 
descriptions, data sources, and descriptive statistics for all variables 
included in our regressions analysis in Section 5. 
                                                 
38 We have to note that in cases where we observe inconsistencies in the classification of tax revenues in the 
various tax categories, observations are excluded from the estimates. For instance, observations for Belgium during 
1923-1925 and 1930-1937 of the variable rural taxes are excluded from the specification, because trade and income 
tax are included in land tax. 
39 It should be noted that in many relevant studies the main explanatory variable is continuous (see e.g., 
Aidt et al., 2006; Aidt and Jensen, 2009b), rather than dichotomous, as in our case, and captures the 
extensions or the contradictions of the voting franchise. For instance, the United Kingdom adopted four 
reform acts between 1832 and 1918 until all adult males were entitled to vote. Of course, in the case of 
Greece we observe only one big reform, which took place in 1864 establishing voting rights to almost 
50% of the population. Despite this difference, we prefer to retain the dichotomous variable Democracy 
in the new specification in order to make the results of Sections 4 and 5 as comparable as possible.   
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Table 4. Fiscal effects of Democratization in Europe 
Panel A: Estimated coefficients          
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable: total taxes direct/indirect  rural taxes urban taxes income taxes trade and corp.  
taxes 
capital taxes customs taxes market taxes 
Democracy 0.673*** 0.476*** 0.087 5.523*** 2.851** 1.171 1.597 -2.218** -2.215* 
 (0.173) (0.153) (0.325) (0.945) (1.123) (0.923) (1.119) (0.719) (1.034) 
Democracy* agricultural rate -0.014** -0.010** -0.007 -0.086*** -0.054* -0.008 -0.022 0.041* 0.039 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.012) (0.017) (0.030) (0.017) (0.025) (0.019) (0.026) 
agricultural rate 0.014 0.018** 0.042 0.184*** 0.121 0.057 0.023 -0.125** -0.062 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.038) (0.057) (0.088) (0.065) (0.032) (0.050) (0.040) 
lagged dependent variable 0.803*** 0.315 0.920*** 0.751*** 0.772*** 0.797*** 0.544** 0.846*** 0.787*** 
 (0.061) (0.193) (0.030) (0.047) (0.079) (0.095) (0.182) (0.039) (0.053) 
GDP per capita -2.384** 0.124 0.686 0.472 1.755 1.197 2.261 -8.900** 9.146*** 
 (0.988) (0.243) (1.262) (2.375) (3.643) (1.128) (1.527) (3.182) (1.974) 
old 0.401*** 0.001 -0.053 0.177 0.765 -0.233 0.350 -0.010 0.657 
 (0.101) (0.024) (0.149) (0.373) (0.445) (0.131) (0.428) (0.450) (0.428) 
population  1.896 -0.144 -1.953** 1.628 2.963 0.217 -2.808 0.894 4.879 
 (1.069) (0.201) (0.873) (1.648) (2.255) (0.906) (3.038) (3.980) (3.057) 
debt crisis -0.165 0.210* 0.052 -0.048 -0.175 0.743 1.173 -2.367 2.196 
 (0.177) (0.116) (0.304) (1.687) (1.371) (0.508) (1.336) (1.906) (2.423) 
currency crisis 0.097 0.052 -1.119 2.118 3.168 0.116 0.231 -2.939** 2.162* 
 (0.234) (0.091) (0.953) (1.220) (2.022) (0.341) (1.171) (1.137) (1.060) 
internal instability -0.418 0.424 0.195 1.211 -1.443 -0.670 0.045 1.053 0.338 
 (0.852) (0.280) (0.541) (3.375) (3.083) (0.652) (0.451) (2.404) (2.266) 
wars 0.130 -0.039 0.124 -0.292 -0.484 0.058 0.763 -0.465 0.831* 
 (0.076) (0.032) (0.103) (0.439) (0.549) (0.210) (0.611) (0.417) (0.407) 
Observations 449 681 687 687 681 681 681 681 681 
R2 0.971 0.837 0.989 0.953 0.934 0.905 0.661 0.988 0.972 
Panel B: Estimated Fiscal Effects of Democracy for Different Values of the agricultural rate      
agricultural rate = 23.19 0.340* 0.240** -0.086 3.538*** 1.597* 0.993 1.082 -1.277*** -1.310** 
 (0.170) (0.080) (0.149) (0.735) (0.745) (0.627) (0.607) (0.374) (0.544) 
agricultural rate = 38.24 (mean) 0.123 0.087* -0.198 2.249*** 0.783 0.878 0.747* -0.666* -0.722 
 (0.218) (0.045) (0.212) (0.687) (0.794) (0.506) (0.395) (0.319) (0.430) 
agricultural rate = 68.34 -0.309 -0.220** -0.421 -0.329 -0.846 0.647 0.078 0.555 0.454 
 (0.362) (0.095) (0.520) (0.845) (1.428) (0.600) (0.763) (0.715) (0.940) 
Notes: Panel A reports OLS estimates. All estimates include a full set of country and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors, clustered by country are reported in parentheses. Panel B 
reports estimates of the derivative of the variable agriculture rate with respect to the variable Democracy with controls set at the mean. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes 
significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level.  
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Table 4 reports our results for the European countries. As can be seen in 
panel A, the variable Democracy is positively correlated with total taxes 
and the share of direct to indirect taxes. Moreover, we observe that these 
changes are driven by the increase in incomes taxes and the decrease of 
both categories of indirect taxes, customs taxes, and market taxes. 
However, and more importantly, these effects are conditional on the 
structure of the economy as revealed by our results for the interaction 
term Democracy*agricultural rate. The interaction term is negative and 
statistically significant when related to the variables total taxes, 
direct/indirect, urban taxes, and income taxes, while the opposite holds 
when related to customs taxes – the effect on market taxes is also positive 
but marginally insignificant. Therefore, our empirical findings suggest that 
the phase of economic development, and the consequent structure of the 
economy, result in a differentiated effect of democratisation on the size 
and structure of taxation.   
To further elucidate this, we calculate the partial derivative for each 
dependent variable in Table 4, with respect to the variable Democracy at 
reasonable values of the agricultural rate. Specifically, these values are 
the mean of our sample (38.24), one standard deviation below the mean 
(23.19) and two standard deviations above the mean (68.34). The lower 
value, 23.19, corresponds to countries like the UK, where upon 
democratisation other sectors beyond the agricultural occupy the vast 
majority of the workforce. The higher value of 38.24 captures cases like 
Norway, where the agricultural sector is at the margins to be the most 
crowded segment of the society, and finally the value 68.34 is close to 
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cases like Finland or Italy, where after democratisation the majority of the 
workforce is occupied in agriculture. In panel B of Table 4 we report the 
marginal effect of democratisation for each of these three values reported 
above.  
What we observe is that for the latter case the agricultural sector 
dominates the economy, the size of the public sector remains unaffected 
after democratisation. Interestingly, and consistent to the results we 
obtained for Greece, the only significant effect is the change of the 
composition of tax revenues in favour of indirect forms of taxation. At the 
mean of our sample, democratisation still has no effect on the size of the 
public sector, but the composition of tax revenues changes now in favour 
of direct forms of taxation like capital taxes, as can be seen in column (7). 
Finally, at lower values of the agricultural rate democratisation has a 
positive effect on the size of the public sector, and on direct forms of 
taxation like income taxes as can be seen in column (5)40. Overall, these 
results are consistent with our expectations that the effect of 
democratisation on the size and the structure of the tax system would 
differ significantly between agricultural and industrial economies, e.g., 
Finland or Greece vs the UK. 
 
 
                                                 
40 We have conducted various robustness tests in order to check the sensitivity of our results. For 
instance, we have checked if our results are affected by outlier observations or the inclusion of 
additional control variables. However, in both cases our results are in line with those depicted in Table 
4.   
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6. Discussion 
 
The main concern of the Greek governments during the first decades after 
independence was the legitimization of their authority. This could be 
achieved by ensuring a minimum level of social cohesion and by 
convincing the citizens of the young Greek state that public demand for 
equality is going to be satisfied. On this basis, a number of political and 
economic benefits were provided to middle and low income agents from 
the very first day after independence. However, fundamental economic 
reforms took place later and, in particular, after the constitution of 1864 
that established a political regime of parliamentary democracy, universal 
male suffrage, and equality of political rights.  
According to Dertilis (2015, pp.769-772), the franchise reform of 1864 was 
accompanied by three significant economic reforms, all of which were in 
favour of the rural population. The first economic reform was the 
distribution of the so-called “public lands” to small peasants and landless 
sharecroppers in 1871. This was accompanied by a second land 
redistribution in 1924 of the large-land estates that were located mostly in 
Thessaly. The second reform was related to changes that took place 
during the 1860s in the functioning of the banking system, which allowed 
the rural population to gain access to low-cost credit from the banks. This 
low-cost credit was further increased after 1928 through the creation of 
the Agricultural Bank of Greece. Finally, the third key economic reform 
was the restructuring of the implemented tax policy. As we have already 
noted, the tax burden on land (i.e., dekati and epikarpia) started to 
decline in 1845 and was then reduced more radically after 1864. 
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Decreases in land taxation that took place during that period were 
accompanied by remarkable increases in indirect taxes. Once again, both 
changes in taxation were in favour of the agricultural population.  
This paper places the spotlight on the third economic reform and 
investigates empirically whether franchise extension was the driving force 
behind observed changes in implemented tax policy. Building on a unique 
tax dataset that contains 13 different tax categories of Greek state during 
the period 1833-1933, our empirical analysis clearly identifies that the 
extension of the voting franchise in 1864 did not affect the level of 
taxation, but significantly changed its structure in favour of the rural 
population. These findings support the hypothesis of the political 
economy motives behind the changes in the composition of taxation. In 
other words, Greek governments proceeded to change taxes in order to 
ensure a minimum level of social consensus and to satisfy the large 
majority of the voters who were peasants and farmers living in rural areas. 
At the same time, in more industrialised European economies, 
democratisation revealed the political preferences of a more urbanized 
electorate (mostly consisting of workers and middle class capitalists), and 
thus led to a different pattern of development of the tax system. 
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Appendix 
 
A1: Summary statistics of variables used in section 4 (Greece) 
 
Variable Description Obs. Mean SD Min Max Source 
Democracy Dummy variable that takes the value of 
one whenever the political regime in 
Greece is categorised as democratic, 
and 0 otherwise 
101 0.584 0.495 0 1 Boix et al. (2013) 
Polity2 Index variable that ranges -10 (extreme 
autocracy) to +10 (perfect democracy) 
101 4.515 6.162 -6 10 Marshall and 
Jaggers (2010) 
total taxes Total tax revenues as a share of GDP 
(%) 
101 13.773 4.072 5.900 26.743 Own calculations 
based on DPH 
and Kostelenos et 
al. (2007) 
rural taxes Sum of land and assessed taxes as a 
share of total tax revenues (%) 
101 32.485 21.501 3.035 75.518 Own calculations 
based on DPH  
urban taxes Sum of income, trade, corporation, 
property, inheritance, extraordinary and 
other direct taxes as a share of total tax 
revenues (%) 
101 7.151 6.631 0.000 31.769 Own calculations 
based on DPH  
payroll taxes Payroll taxes as a share of total tax 
revenues (%) 
101 0.540 1.372 0.000 5.316 Own calculations 
based on DPH  
non-payroll taxes Non-payroll taxes as a share of total tax 
revenues (%) 
101 0.310 0.744 0.000 3.168 Own calculations 
based on DPH  
trade and 
corporation taxes 
Sum of trade and corporation taxes as a 
share of total tax revenues (%) 
101 2.684 1.121 0.000 5.733 Own calculations 
based on DPH  
capital taxes Sum of property and inheritance taxes 
as a share of total tax revenues (%) 
101 2.146 1.297 0.000 5.854 Own calculations 
based on DPH  
customs taxes Customs taxes as a share of total tax 
revenues (%) 
101 34.078 7.766 17.618 55.150 Own calculations 
based on DPH  
market taxes Sum of excise, turnover, and other 
indirect taxes as a share of total tax 
revenues (%) 
101 26.286 13.895 2.495 47.000 Own calculations 
based on DPH  
direct/indirect  Ratio of direct taxes -rural and urban 
taxes- to indirect taxes -customs and 
market taxes.  
101 0.845 0.679 0.204 3.085 Own calculations 
based on DPH  
GDP per capita Log of GDP per capita 101 5.435 0.164 5.040 5.847 Kostelenos et al. 
(2007) 
agricultural rate Population within Greece living in 
cities of less than two thousand people 
(%) 
101 70.441 6.302 56.500 80.000 Dertilis (1993) 
old Population over the age 
of 65 as a share of total population 
(%). 
101 3.919 0.918 3.058 5.905 Siampos (1973) 
population spikes Dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 in the years 1864, 1881, 1913, 1920 
and 1922, and 0 otherwise. 
101 0.050 0.218 0 1 Own calculations 
debt crisis Dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 the years 1833-1878, 1894-1897 and 
1932-1933, and 0 otherwise. 
101 0.020 0.140 0 1 Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010) 
currency crisis Dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 the years 1919-1921, 1924 and 1931, 
and 0 otherwise. 
101 0.515 0.502 0 1 Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010) 
internal instability Dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 the years 1843, 1862, 1909 and 1916-
1917, and 0 otherwise.  
101 0.139 0.347 0 1 Own calculations 
wars Dummy variable that takes the value of 
1 during the years 1866-1869, 1878, 
1897, 1912-1913 and 1917-1922, and 0 
otherwise. 
101 0.050 0.218 0 1 Own calculations 
Notes: DPH= Dertilis (1993), Prontzas et al. (2011) and Historical Archives of the National Bank of Greece  
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A2: Summary statistics of variables used in section 5 (Europe) 
 
Variable Description Obs. Mean SD Min Max Source 
Democracy Dummy variable that equals to one 
whenever a political regime is 
characterized as democratic and 0 
otherwise 
697 0.492 0.500 0 1 Boix et al. (2013) 
total taxes Total tax revenues as a share of GDP 
(%) 
455 7.166 3.670 1.300 20.500 Flora et al. (1983) 
        
rural taxes Sum of land and assessed taxes as a 
share of total tax revenues (%) 
697 9.026 9.569 0 33.800 Own calculations 
based on Flora et 
al. (1983) 
urban taxes Sum of income, trade, corporation, 
property, inheritance, extraordinary and 
other direct taxes as a share of total tax 
revenues (%) 
697 18.803 15.011 0 73.500 Own calculations 
based on Flora et 
al. (1983) 
income taxes Income taxes as a share of total tax 
revenues (%) 
697 4.240 5.097 0 20.800 Flora et al. (1983) 
trade and 
corporation 
taxes 
Sum of trade and corporation taxes as a 
share of total tax revenues (%) 
697 8.730 11.689 0 72.000 Own calculations 
based on Flora et 
al. (1983) 
capital taxes Sum of property and inheritance taxes as 
a share of total tax revenues (%) 
697 2.668 3.586 0 30.400 Own calculations 
based on Flora et 
al. (1983) 
customs taxes Customs taxes as a share of total tax 
revenues (%) 
697 30.806 23.826 3.828 96.400 Flora et al. (1983) 
market taxes Sum of excise, turnover, and other 
indirect taxes as a share of total tax 
revenues (%) 
697 41.366 16.025 0.000 73.900 Own calculations 
based on Flora et 
al. (1983) 
direct/indirect Ratio of direct taxes -rural and urban 
taxes- to indirect taxes -customs and 
market taxes.  
697 0.456 0.364 0 2.773 Own calculations 
based on Flora et 
al. (1983) 
GDP per capita Log of GDP per capita 697 7.934 0.360 6.997 8.753 Bolt and van 
Zanden (2014) 
agricultural rate Share of workforce occupied in 
agriculture (%) 
697 38.242 15.052 5.700 69.300 Banks and Wilson 
(2015) 
old Population over the age 
of 65 as a share of total population 
(%). 
697 6.385 1.234 3.465 9.745 Mitcell (2003) 
population  Log of population 697 9.233 1.167 7.497 11.098 Bolt and van 
Zanden (2014) 
debt crisis Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if a debt (domestic or external) crisis 
occurred during the year, and 0 
otherwise. 
697 0.009 0.092 0 1 Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010) 
currency crisis Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if a currency crisis occurred during the 
year, and 0 otherwise. 
697 0.047 0.213 0 1 Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010) 
internal 
instability 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if a revolutionary event took place in a 
given year, and 0 otherwise. 
697 0.366 0.482 0 1 Aidt and Jensen 
(2014) 
wars Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
if a country participated in an armed 
conflict with another country in a given 
year, and 0 otherwise. 
697 0.053 0.224 0 1 Brecke (1999) 
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